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Grid Valuation of Beef Carcass Quality: Market Power and Market Trends

Abstract

The fed cattle grid pricing system’s premium and discount incentive mechanism is
investigated. Two issues are addressed: a) we investigate changes in the weekly market value of
an animal’s carcass quality attributes as determined by the USDA-Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS) additive grid; and b) an evaluation of the effect of packer behavior on grid
valuation of carcass quality attributes.
A pooled-cross sectional data set containing carcass information on 598 fed steers
evaluated weekly on the AMS publically reported price grid (National Carcass Premiums and
Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers) was constructed for the years 2001 to 2008 (226,000
observations). Thus individual animal carcass quality characteristics are held constant through
time.
For the 598 animals included in this study, the empirical evidence suggests that: a)
premiums and discounts associated with specific carcass quality attributes have been adjusting
over time; b) during periods of packer cooperative behavior in the fed cattle market, the market
value of carcass quality declined, on average, by $0.50 per hundred weight; and c) the average
market value of an animal’s carcass quality, meeting industry quality standards, exhibited a
positive trend during the study period. This implies the grid incentive mechanism strengthened
during this period for those producers who produced fed cattle that met industry quality
standards.

1

Grid Valuation of Beef Carcass Quality: Market Power and Market Trends

Introduction:
Published studies in the grid pricing literature have focused on numerous issues revolving around
the economic incentive structure associated with marketing on a grid (see Fausti et al. 2010 for a
discussion of this literature). A subset of these studies has investigated how effective the grid
premium and discount incentive mechanism has performed as an information transmission
mechanism (e.g., Feuz 1999; Fausti and Qasmi 2002, Johnson and Ward 2005 and 2006; Fausti
et al. 2014). To date, a long-run empirical study of grid premium and discount behavior has not
be conducted for the post-MPR (Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act of 1999) era.
In addition, the empirical grid pricing literature has not addressed the issue of how
market structure may influence the grid incentive mechanism. The issue of packer market power
in the slaughter cattle market has been a popular area of study for economists. Empirical studies
in this area have developed both long-run and short-run models to investigate packer market
power in the meatpacking and fed cattle markets (e.g., Azzam and Anderson 1996; Ward 2010).
The issue of packer market power influencing fed cattle producer grid marketing
decisions has been discussed in the theoretical (grid pricing) literature by Whitley (2002) and
Fausti et al. (2013). No empirical investigation on whether oligopsony power influences grid
premium and discount levels has appeared in the literature. Our objective is to investigate; a)
long-run trends in the weekly market value of an animal’s carcass quality attributes to assess the
evolution of the grid pricing structure as a market signaling mechanism in the post-MPR era, and
b) the effect of packer behavior on grid valuation of carcass quality attributes using identified
periods of packer cooperative versus non-cooperative behavior (Cai et al. 2011). A linear mixed
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modeling approach that encompasses both fixed and random effects is employed to identify
factors that influence the market evaluation of carcass quality within a grid pricing mechanism.

Literature Review:
The two fields of literature associated with this study are: a) meat-packer behavior in the fed
cattle market; and b) the evolution of the grid pricing mechanism for fed cattle. Both of these
literature areas are extensive. To optimize space the discussion will focus on contributions
germane to the issues addressed in this study. We direct the reader to Ward (2010) for a review
of the issues and research on the beef industry’s industrial structure. We suggest Fausti et al.
(2010) for a discussion of the grid pricing literature.
Meat-Packer Conduct when Purchasing Fed Cattle
The meat-packing market-conduct empirical literature can be divided into long and short-run
behavioral studies. Long-run behavioral studies on the fed cattle market have followed two
approaches: a) structure-performance (e.g., Menkhaus et al. 1981); and b) conjectural variation
(e.g., Schroeter 1988). Short-run empirical behavioral studies are based on game theory
predictions of cooperative versus non-cooperative firm behavior within an oligopoly market
structure (e.g., Koontz et al. 1993; Koontz and Garcia 1997; Carlberg et al. 2009; Cai et al.
2011). These studies evaluate changes in packer margins to identify cooperative and noncooperative short-run behavior in the slaughter cattle market. The implication drawn from this
literature is that oligopsony behavior in the slaughter cattle market is intermittent and the degree
of market power varies across time.
The objective of Cai et al. (2011) is to evaluate the beef packing industry’s fed cattle
pricing behavior in the pre and post periods associated with implementation of the MPR. They
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employ a Markov process within a regime switching regression model to identify periods of
oligopsony behavior. Their empirical model provides time-period range estimates of
collaborative versus non-collaborative packer pricing behavior (pp. 614-615). They conclude that
during the post-MPR period, oligopsony rents were higher during cooperative periods, the
duration of non-cooperative periods declined, and during non-cooperative periods firms behaved
competitively. We rely upon the periods identified by Cai et al. (2011) to empirically test if
packer oligopsony market power affected grid price assessment of carcass quality during
cooperative periods.
Carcass Quality Attributes and Grid Price Transmission
The value based marketing initiative (National Cattlemen's Association: Value Based Marketing
Taskforce 1990) was the beef industry’s response to declining beef demand. The literature
indicates that beef demand began to decline in the late 1970s, bottomed in the late 1990s and has
not fully recovered (Schroeder et al. 1998; Fausti et al. 2010). The goal of this initiative is to
increase beef demand by improving the overall quality of beef carcasses; and improve
production efficiency along the beef supply chain. Grid pricing of fed cattle is a key component
in the beef industry’s value based marketing initiative. The beef industry identified the practice
of selling fed cattle by the pen at an average price as a significant source of the inconsistency in
carcass quality and a factor associated with weak beef demand (Fausti et al. 1998).
The grid pricing literature has documented that the outcome of selling cattle based on
individual carcass merits is dependent of carcass quality. Therefore, the per-head grid revenue
can be either above or below the pen average per-head price when cattle are sold live or dressed
weight (e.g., Feuz et al. 1993; McDonald and Schroeder 2003). However, Ward (2005) shows
that packers consistently pay more (less) for high quality cattle when purchased on a grid (live
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weight by the pen) relative to mid-quality cattle purchased by dressed weight. Conversely, the
literature also demonstrates that per-pen revenue variability increases when selling on a grid
regardless of cattle quality (e.g., Fausti et al. 1998; Schroeder and Graff 2000; Anderson and
Zeuli 2001; Feuz et al. 1995).
A number of studies have investigated the properties of the grid pricing method as a price
transmission mechanism for market preferences with respect to specific carcass quality attributes
(Feuz et al. 1993; Feuz 1999; Schroeder and Graff 2000; Fausti and Qasmi 2002; Johnson and
Ward 2005 and 2006; Faust et al. 2014). The general consensus of the literature is that grid
pricing mechanisms do transmit market preferences for carcass quality. However, the grid
pricing system seems to have a bias toward discounts. This literature suggests that the incentive
of grid premiums may not be strong enough to overcome the financial risk associated with grid
discounts to induce a majority of fed cattle producers to sell their cattle on a grid (Fausti and
Feuz 1995; Fausti et al. 1998; Fausti and Qasmi 2002; Johnson and Ward 2005 and 2006). Thus,
it is argued that the discount bias represents a barrier to adoption by producers. In a recent study,
Fausti et al. (2014) reports empirical evidence that this negative bias is weakening.
We extend this literature by empirically estimating the adjustment in grid premiums and
discounts over time and quantifying their effect on the valuation of carcass quality attributes. To
our knowledge, the long-run dynamic effect of grid premiums and discounts on individual
carcass quality attribute valuation has not been addressed in the literature.

Theoretical Background
We are interested in the long-run economic relationship between carcass quality attributes and
grid price signals. We investigate if: a) the grid price mechanism’s premium and discount
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structure is evolving over time; and b) identified periods of packer oligopsony behavior effect the
grid pricing mechanism’s valuation of carcass quality.
The innovative aspect of this research is the construction of a weekly pooled time-series
cross-sectional data set that evaluates the grid incentive mechanism using the animal’s assessed
premium or discount relative to the grid’s base price. Following the approach of Fausti and
Qasmi (2002) and Fausti et al. (2014), the unique characteristic of this study is that carcass
quality characteristics are held constant across time. Thus, market prices are the sole source of
weekly variation in carcass value. This study differs from the above mentioned studies because
our data set contains weekly AMS grid estimates for 598 individual steers rather than pen level
averages.
Grid Pricing Mechanism
We adopt an approach followed by Feuz (1999). Feuz’s study is unique because it focuses on the
animal’s levied premium or discount (pp. 333-34). Feuz’s equation 5 encompasses an individual
steer carcass’s grid premium or discount per hundred weight. Simplifying Feuz’s equation 5, we
arrive at Feuz’s “value based price premium” (VBP). We derive our version of VBP following
the approach discussed in Fausti et al. (1998). Fausti et al. suggest using the AMS additive grid
to derive VBP estimates for individual animal dressed weight carcasses.
Our extension of the Feuz approach allows us to evaluate a single set of slaughter steers
over an extended time period. We hypothesize that the influence of the interaction of an animal’s
carcass quality attributes and a grid’s incentive mechanism on VBP can be revealed by
identifying the dynamics of the market on carcass valuation over time.
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Market Power in the Fed Cattle Market
The second hypothesis to be empirically tested in this study is if there is evidence of oligopsony
market power in the grid pricing system. Cai et al. (2011) empirically identify periods of
cooperative and non-cooperative market power in the fed cattle market that has resulted in
oligopsony rents in the post-MPR period. Their empirical model is derived from the theoretical
underpinnings of a branch of the Industrial Organization literature, commonly referred to as the
“new empirical industrial organization” branch (Calberg et al. 2009). Cai et al. (2011: pp. 60811) presents theoretical and empirical models based on firm behavioral assumptions outlined in
Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a multiple player dynamic game. Cai et al. (2011) use a
Markov regime switching model to estimate packer margins that provide approximations for
dating and duration of cooperative and non-cooperative regimes in the fed cattle market (page
615).
To test if market power is affecting a slaughter steer’s VBP; we model the periods
identified by Cai et al. (2011: Table 3/Figure 2) as cooperative and non-cooperative behavior
using a simple bivariate dummy variable. It is assumed that the market power price effect varies
randomly across the 598 steers. The random effects assumption is consistent with the literature’s
conclusion that oligopsony behavior in the slaughter cattle market is intermittent and the degree
of market power varies across time.

Data:
A pooled time series; cross-sectional data set containing carcass information on fed steers
evaluated weekly on the USDA-AMS publically reported price grid (National Carcass Premiums
and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers) was constructed for the years 2001 to 2008. The
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carcass data contain carcass characteristics for 598 slaughter steers (see Table 1) collected by the
Animal Science Department at SDSU as part of a ranch to rail study (Fausti et al. 2003).
The price data were collected from USDA weekly grid premium and discount reports.
We used an additive premium and discount price grid as suggested by Fausti et al. (1998).The
price data were used to simulate individual animal weekly per head VBP using the AMS price
grid data from April 2001 to June 2008. We also collected AMS weekly reported Nebraska
dressed weight price (35% to 65% choice) to represent the general price level for the slaughter
cattle market (Nebraska Weekly Direct Slaughter Cattle-Negotiated Purchases (LM_CT158)).
Price data is combined with individual animal carcass characteristics. A total of 378 weeks of
price data were simulated. The data set contains 226,044 observations.
The dating of meatpacker cooperative versus non-cooperative behavior periods is based
on estimates of cooperative behavior duration by Cai et al. (2011: page 615-Table 3). Based on
Cai et. al. (2011) we determined that there were eight cooperative periods that occurred between
2004 and 2008. These periods are listed in Table 2. In Table 3, the simple bivariate dummy
representing cooperative periods (MP) has a mean of 0.548, indicating that during the period of
our study cooperative regime behavior occurred approximately fifty-five percent of the time.

Empirical Methodology:
Approach
A pooled time-series regression model is used to investigate the influence of carcass quality
characteristics on an individual animal’s premium or discount per hundredweight relative to the
AMS grid base price. We refer to this levied premium or discount as VBP. We regress VBP on
dummy variables reflecting individual steer carcass quality based on categories defined by the
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AMS grid. We employ quarterly dummy variables to account for seasonality, a time trend
variable, interaction terms, and the weekly hot carcass dressed weight price. We also employ a
simple bivariate dummy variable (MP) reflecting periods of packer cooperative versus noncooperative behavior.
The standard assumptions associated with the linear mixed model (LMM) are listed in
equations 1-4. Using the standard vector notation provided in the SAS/Stat 9.3 User Guide (SAS
Institute, 2011), we define the general structure of the model as:
1. 𝑉𝐵𝑃 = Χ𝛽 + 𝑍𝛾 + 𝜀,
2. 𝛾 ∼ 𝑵(𝑂, 𝐺),
3. 𝜀 ∼ 𝑵(𝑂, 𝑅), and
4. 𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝛾, 𝜖) = 0.

The dependent variable (VBP) denotes the vector of dependent variable observations.
Matrix X is the design matrix associated with β, which represents the vector of unknown fixed
effects parameters. Matrix Z is the design matrix associated with γ, representing the vector of
unknown random effects parameters. The error term, ε, reflects an unknown random error vector.
Equation 4 states that γ and ε are independent, which implies that the variance of VBP (SAS
Institute, 1999: p. 2087) can be defined as:
5. 𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝑉𝐵𝑃] = 𝑍𝐺𝑍 𝑇 + 𝑅. 1
Matrices G and R are the covariance matrices associated with γ and ε, respectively. The
mixed procedure requires the covariance matrices G and R to be specified. We used a variance
components specification for G and a blocked (subject-dependent) first order autoregressive
specification for R. These specifications are based on regression diagnostics.

1

The superscript notation “T” denotes the transpose matrix operation.
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A Mixed Effects model that includes both fixed and random effects was selected to
analyze the data. Equation 1 provides the general functional form for a Mixed Effects model and
below is our modified version:
8
3
6) 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑8𝑗=1 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑598
𝑖=1 𝛾𝑖 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑡 + ∑𝑘=1 𝜃𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑘𝑡 + ∑𝑗=1 𝜑𝑗 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑇𝑡 +

𝜔𝑃𝑡 + 𝜌𝑃𝑡 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜗𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 598, 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 8, 𝑘 = 1 𝑡𝑜 3, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1 𝑡𝑜 378.
For our analysis: a) VBPit denotes the individual animal’s weekly grid determined carcass
quality attribute valuation (defined in terms of dollars per hundred weight; b) C denotes
individual animal carcass quality characteristics; c) T denotes the time trend variable; d) S
denotes the seasonal quarterly dummy variables; e) P denotes the AMS reported Nebraska
dressed weight price (HCWP); f) MP denotes a fixed effects bivariate dummy variable
representing cooperative and non-cooperative periods; and g) Z is the design matrix associated
with γ i, the random effects parameter estimate, and ε is as defined above. Subscripts denote
matrix dimensions: a) subscript i denotes the number of subjects; b) subscript j denotes the
number of carcass quality dummy variables; c) subscript t denotes the number of time periods;
and d) subscript k denotes the number of seasonal dummy variables. Parameters α, β, θ, δ, φ, ω,
ρ, and ϑ represent fixed effects, and γ denotes the random effects parameter estimate.
Fixed and Random Effects Variables Defined
Quarterly seasonal dummy variables were constructed with October, November, and December
designated as the base quarter, along with a weekly time trend variable. Based on the Cai et al.
(2011) we constructed a bivariate dummy variable representing packer cooperative (MP=1)
versus non-cooperative periods (MP=0). The MP variable was also selected as the random
effects variable to test the Cai et al. (2011: p.625) conclusion that “…estimates of regimedependent variances, p1 and p2, are significant and vary across regimes.” Thus, the MP fixed
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effects estimate is the average effect across all subjects (steers) and the random effects
assumption produces unique estimates for individual steers.
We included Pt to determine if a change in the market price for slaughter cattle affected
how the market rewards carcass characteristics over time. Fausti and Qasmi (2002) hypothesized
that such a relationship may exist between the HCWP and grid premium and discount levels.
Carcass quality variable categories are based on marbling score and kidney/pelvic/heart
fat measurements and were then converted into dummy variables. Quality grade categories are
prime, choice, select, and standard, with choice as the base. Yield grade variable categories are
yield grade less than 2 (YG1), yield grade between 2 and 3 (YG2), and yield grade of 4 or
greater (YG45). The yield grade category 3 to 4 is designated as the base. Heavy weight carcass
dummy variable (HWT) reflects a carcass with HCW>950 and the light weight carcass dummy
variable (LWT) reflects a carcass with HCW<600. Interaction terms combining the time trend
variable with carcass traits are used to determine if there is a trend in the market incentive
mechanism. HCWP interaction term was included to test if the market price level influence on
grid premium and discount levels has been changing over time. Summary statistics for
exogenous variables are provided in Table 3.
Model Diagnostics
The empirical analysis was conducted using SAS version 9.3. The Mixed Effects model was
estimated using SAS’s Restricted Maximum Likelihood method. The LMM procedure in SAS
provides great flexibility dealing with regression diagnostic issues (SAS Institute, 1999). First,
we conducted stationary tests for the two continuous variables in our model, VBP and HCWP.
The Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test (SAS-ETS 1999: p.332) indicated that both variables are
stationary at a p-value of less than 0.001.
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Next, we employed a “sandwich estimator” approach to produce robust standard errors
associated with parameter estimates (SAS Institute, 1999, chapter 41; and Diggle et al., 1994).
The default covariance structure for the Mixed procedure is variance components (SAS 1999: p.
2088).1 Other covariance structures for G and R were investigated. The variance components
structure was selected for matrix G, and the autoregressive of order one was selected for matrix
R. Both covariance structure assumptions were based on the “Null Model Likelihood Ratio
Test.” We also used the Likelihood Ratio Test to determine if the random effects assumption was
valid. The test indicated that this assumption is valid at a p-value less than 0.001.

Results:
Summary statistics presented in Table 3 indicate 52.21% of the 598 carcasses graded choice,
39.6% graded select, 6.85% graded standard, and 1.34% graded prime. Carcasses receiving a
yield grade less than 2 accounted for 17.2% of the sample. Yield grade 2 to 3 accounted for
48.3%, and 6% received a yield grade of 4 or greater. Yield grade 3 to 4 carcasses accounted for
28.5% of the sample. Carcasses determined to either HWT and LWT accounted for 1% and 2%
of the carcasses graded, respectively. The per-hundred weight premium/discount variable (VBP)
averaged -$4.87.
The variance components estimating procedure provided evidence that the variance
associated with matrix G’s contribution to the variance of matrix V (covariance matrix for VBP)
was significant at the one percent level (Table 4). Given the statistical significance of the
random effects covariance parameter estimate and the Likelihood Ratio Test result, we believe
the mixed model assumption is justified.
1

The Likelihood Ratio Test indicated that variance components covariance matrix was superior to the OLS diagonal
2
covariance structure (σ I), were I is the identity matrix.
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Overview of Fixed Effects Estimates
Type 3 tests indicate that all fixed effects variables are statistically significant at a p-value less
than 0.01. The fixed effects intercept estimate is -$0.84 (Table 5). This intercept represents the
industry standard carcass. The industry standard carcass is the default carcass quality in our
empirical model. If all of the fixed effect dummy variables are set to their default value, and
assume t=0 and HCWP =$100, then a quality grade choice, yield grade 3 carcass weighing
between 600 and 950 will receive: VBP= -$0.84 + $0.63 = -$0.21 per hundred weight. At the
other end of the time spectrum (t=378), when HCWP is $100 cwt, the VBP for the industry
standard carcass is estimated at: -$0.84 + $0.63 + $1.46 = $1.25 per hundred weight. These back
of the envelope calculations suggest that the long-run trend reflected in the grid price signaling
mechanism is positive for steer carcasses that meet the industry standard. This finding is
consistent with Fausti et al. (2014).
Fit statistics for the LML model are provided in Table 4. We conclude the fixed effects
component of the model does explain differences in VBP across individual animals included in
the data set. Fixed effects parameter estimates for main and interaction effect variables are
presented in Table 5.
Main Effects
All carcass quality dummy parameter estimates have the expected sign (premium versus
discount). The parameter values fall within the expected range, given the inclusion of the
interaction terms.
Quarterly seasonal dummy variable parameter estimates indicate that relative to the
fourth quarter; VBP increases in the first and third quarters, and declines in the second quarter.
The seasonality estimates are consistent with the literature (e.g., Fausti and Qasmi 2002).
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The parameter estimate for HCWP is positive and significant (p<0.001) indicating that while the
market price for slaughter cattle is not directly related to VBP it does positively influence VBP.
This finding supports the Supply Response Hypothesis proposed by Fausti and Qasmi (2002: p.
31).
The market power dummy variable (MP) was negative and significant (p<0.001)
indicating that during cooperative periods VBP declined by approximately $0.50 per
hundredweight relative to non-cooperative periods. For a dressed carcass weighing 800 pounds,
this implies a reduction of four dollars in per head revenue. Our empirical results support
empirical work of Cai et al. (2001) demonstrating that the packing industry generates oligopsony
rents in the fed cattle market during cooperative periods. Our contribution to the market structure
literature is that there is also evidence of oligopsony rents being extracted when slaughter cattle
are sold on a grid during cooperative periods.
Indirect Fixed Effects
We created interaction terms between Tt and Cijt, and between Tt and HCWPt. The
interaction terms indicate that the quality characteristics of Prime and YG1 exhibit a positive
trend in market value with respect to their influence on VBP over time. The quality
characteristics of Standard, YG45, and LWT all exhibit a negative trend, suggesting that these
carcass attributes experienced a deepening of the market discount during the period of the study.
The carcass attributes of YG2 and HWT both had unexpected signs. The interaction term for
yield grade 2-3 was negative; indicating the premium paid for this attribute has weakened. The
interaction term for HWT was positive suggesting this discount category has weakened. The
parameter estimate for Select carcass interaction term was negative. This suggests that the
discount on select quality grade carcasses deepened during this period.
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Overall, the interaction terms indicate a pattern of intensification across grid discounts
and premiums. This suggests a strengthening of market signals for specific characteristics. This
is especially true with respect to the quality grade versus yield categories. The interaction
parameter estimates for quality grade categories are an order of magnitude higher than for the
yield grade categories.
The final interaction term estimated was for HCWP. The parameter estimate was
negative and statistically significant, but the low magnitude suggests the relationship between
VBP and market price had a significant positive relationship overall. This suggests that the rising
price of cattle played an important role in the positive change in VBP over the seven year period.
Overview of Random Effects Estimates
We hypothesize that oligopsony market power represents a random effects explanatory
variable based on the work of Cai et al. (2011). Using the variance components estimating
procedure we found that the MP covariance parameter estimate associated with matrix G was
statistically significant at less than one percent. This supports the supposition that there is
variability in the level of persistence and intensity of oligopsony market power in the fed cattle
grid pricing system (Table 4).
The random effects option in SAS also produces parameter estimates for γi. The fixed
effects parameter estimate for MP (-$0.50) represents the average effect of oligopsony behavior
for the group of 598 head during cooperative periods.1 The parameter estimates for γi represent
the estimated effect of cooperative periods on individual steers. Thus these estimates (not
reported but summary statistics for γi are reported in Table 1) reflect the marginal adjustment to

1

The fixed effects parameter estimate for MP represents a shift in the estimated intercept. The -$0.50 per
hundredweight is an estimate of oligopsony rent during cooperative periods relative to non-cooperative
periods. Cai et al. (2011: p. 614) concluded that during non-cooperative periods in the post MPR period
packers behaved competitively.
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fixed effect parameter estimate for MP due to differences in carcass quality attributes across the
598 steers.
To gain insight on how cooperative periods affect the grid premium and discount
structure we ran an auxiliary OLS regression. We regressed the γi parameter estimates on the
carcass quality attribute dummy variables; Cij. We employed a simple OLS model that is defined
in equation 7 (SAS Ver. 9.3):
7) 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑

8
𝑗=1

𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖 ,

𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 598.

We tested for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) estimates
are all less than 2. However, heteroscedasticity was detected and a White correction procedure
was implemented to generate Heteroscedasticity Consistent-Standard Errors (White 1980, p.
822). We also generate and report partial R-square estimates (Table 6).
All of the explanatory variables were statistically significant and negative, except prime
and YG1 were positive (Table 6). The estimated intercept ($0.41) represents the adjustment to
the fixed effect (MP) parameter estimate for an industry standard carcass (Choice, YG3, 600-950
lbs.). This estimate suggests that packers did extract $0.09 per hundredweight in oligopsony rent
during cooperative periods from carcasses meeting the industry quality standard. The positive
coefficient for prime ($0.05) suggests that even prime carcasses were subject to a small
oligopsony rent ($0.04) during the period covered in this study. This is surprising given that
only a very small percentage of carcasses grade prime and this carcass attribute is primarily
purchased by white tablecloth restaurants; a very competitive niche market.
Parameter estimates for yield grade characteristics are statistically significant. Only the
YG1 had a positive parameter estimate. This suggests that both yield grade premiums and
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discounts experienced downward pressure during cooperative periods. Both the LWT and HWT
discounts were also negatively affected during cooperative periods.
Parameter estimates for select and standard carcasses indicate that quality grade discounts
experienced the greatest pricing pressure during cooperative periods. During cooperative periods
the select and standard grade category discounts deepened by $0.87 and $0.88 per
hundredweight, respectively. In addition the partial R-square estimates indicate that select and
standard grade categories explained eighty and nineteen percent of the variability in γi,
respectively (table 6). This finding is consistent with literature on importance of the
choice/select spread in a grid pricing system (e.g. Ward and Johnson 2005). The remaining
variables, combined, contribute less than one percent to the model’s R-square.
The empirical evidence suggests that during cooperative periods, packing firms extracted
oligopsony rent primarily through the grid discount structure. Within the grid discount structure,
oligopsony rent was extracted primarily from the carcass quality grade discount categories. The
empirical evidence further suggests that oligopsony pricing power focused primarily on the grid
discount structure lends credence to a general complaint raised by producers that the grid system
is a pricing system of discounts only (e.g., Fausti et al. 1998; Johnson and Ward 2005).

Discussion:
A long-run empirical analysis investigated the grid pricing system’s ability to convey
market signals, and if meatpackers exerted oligopsony pricing in the slaughter cattle market for
cattle sold on a grid. With respect to the transmission of market signals, we adopted an approach
suggested by Feuz (1999). Empirical evidence suggests that, on average, a pattern of
intensification across grid discounts and premiums has occurred over time. This trend has led to
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a general improvement in the market valuation of carcass quality attributes for the 598 steers
included in this study that meet the industry standard for carcass quality. This positive trend
suggests the barriers to grid price adoption are weakening over time, but the grid discount
structure continues to be an issue.
The second objective focused on oligopsony market power in the slaughter cattle market.
The work of Cai et al. (2011) was extended by adopting their empirical duration estimates of
cooperative meatpacker behavior. We incorporated identified periods of cooperative behavior
into the empirical model to test if oligopsony market power affected an individual steer’s carcass
premium and discount. The empirical results indicate that indeed, during periods of cooperative
behavior, packers extracted oligopsony rents primarily through the deepening of carcass quality
discounts. Thus, one could argue that oligopsony behavior during cooperative periods could pose
a barrier to adoption for those producers who are uncertain about the quality of the cattle they are
marketing.
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Table 1. Cattle Quality Characteristics and γi Estimates: 598 OBS
Variable1
HCW
Dress
REA
FT
KPH
Marb
YG
QG

N
Mean
Std Dev Minimum Maximum
598
743.186
74.246
579.000
991.000
598
60.683
2.081
53.086
69.700
598
12.548
1.437
8.100
20.300
598
0.433
0.175
0.100
1.100
598
1.866
0.598
0.500
3.500
598
493.094
91.653
340.000
830.000
598
2.746
0.751
0.564
5.237
598
2.520
0.644
1.000
4.000
γi
598
0.003
0.475
-0.814
0.5499
1. Variable acronyms: a) HCW is hot carcass weight; b) Dress is animal
dressing percentage; c) REA is rib-eye area; d) FT denotes fat thickness
over the 7th rib; e) KPH is kidney-pelvic-heart fat measurement; f) MARB
is marbling score; g) YG denotes USDA yield grade score; h) QG is USDA
yield grade score; and i) denotes the OLS parameter estimate for the effect
of MP on individual steer VBP.

Table 2. Beef Packing Industry Cooperative Time Periods
Cooperative Period
MP1
MP2
MP3
MP4
MP5
MP6
MP7
MP8

Period (weeks)
0<weeks<39
53<weeks<81
106<weeks<150
157<weeks<168
206<weeks<220
241<weeks<283
299<weeks<324
367<weeks

Start Date
04/09/01
04/15/02
04/21/03
04/12/04
03/21/05
11/21/05
01/01/07
04/12/08
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End Date
12/26/01
10/14/02
02/09/04
06/21/04
06/13/05
08/28/06
06/18/07
06/21/08

Table 3. Summary Statistics: VBP Data Set
Variable
VBP (dependent)
QS1
QS2
QS3
Time
Prime
Choice
Select
Standard
YG1
YG2
YG45
HWT
LWT
HCWP
MP

N
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044
226044

Mean
-4.868
0.238
0.272
0.243
189.500
0.013
0.522
0.396
0.069
0.172
0.483
0.060
0.010
0.022
131.314
0.548

Std Dev
6.780
0.426
0.445
0.429
109.119
0.115
0.500
0.489
0.253
0.378
0.500
0.238
0.100
0.146
15.887
0.497
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Minimum Maximum
-44.430
15.280
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
1.000
378.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
97.800
172.460
0.000
1.000

Table 4. Variance Components Statistics and LML
Model Fit Statistics
Covariance
Parameter
MP
AR(1)
Residual
LML Fit Statistics
-2 Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC
Intraclass
Correlation
Coefficient
Likelihood Ratio
Test: Unrestricted
Model (Mixed Effects
MP) Versus
Restricted Model
(Fixed Effects MP)

Covariance Parameter
Estimate & Z statistic
0.2157: Z=14.28
0.9626: Z=1688.4
8.3747: Z=65.72
534260.7
534266.7
534279.9
ICCMP = 2.26%
ICCAR1 = 10.08%
Likelihood Ratio Test
Statistic=1784.8
Pr> ChiSq <.0001 with DF=1.
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Table 5. VBP REML Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates
Variable
DF
Estimate Std. Error
t Value
Intercept
23K
-0.8389
0.0663
-12.66
QS1
23K
0.1526
0.0082
18.55
QS2
23K
-0.2092
0.0099
-21.03
QS3
23K
0.1999
0.0088
22.80
Time
23K
0.0039
0.0004
9.27
Prime
23K
4.7287
0.0540
87.51
Select
23K
-7.9377
0.0256
-310.52
Standard
23K
-16.7322
0.2711
-61.72
Yg1
23K
2.7584
0.0467
60.39
Yg2
23K
1.5183
0.0189
80.14
Yg45
23K
-13.3550
0.2246
-59.47
HWT
23K
-9.1095
0.0640
-142.37
LWT
23K
-3.5585
0.9774
-3.64
HCWP
23K
0.0063
0.0006
11.18
Time*Prime
23K
0.0167
0.0001
259.74
Time*Select
23K
-0.0036
0.0001
-85.52
Time*standard
23K
-0.0029
0.0001
-31.81
Time*Yg1
23K
0.0004
0.0001
5.85
Time*Yg2
23K
-0.0006
0.0001
-13.72
Time*Yg45
23K
-0.0010
0.0001
-16.96
Time*HWT
23K
0.0132
0.0001
173.06
Time*LWT
23K
-0.0008
0.0003
-3.08
Time*HCWP
23K
-0.00003
0.0001
-9.90
MP
597
-0.4966
0.0209
-23.78
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Pr > |t|
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
0.0003
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
0.0021
< .0001
< .0001

Table 6. OLS Estimates of MP Random Effects Coefficient Model
Variable
DF
Estimate
Std Error
t Value
Pr > |t|
Intercept
1
0.4071
0.0016
249.28
< .0001
Prime
1
0.0465
0.0073
6.35
< .0001
Select
1
-0.8729
0.0020
-448.73
< .0001
Standard
1
-0.7781
0.0036
-215.73
< .0001
Yg1
1
0.0413
0.0029
14.51
< .0001
Yg2
1
-0.0167
0.0021
-8.03
< .0001
Yg45
1
-0.1019
0.0038
-27.08
< .0001
LWT
1
-0.0105
0.0058
-1.81
0.0715
HWT
1
-0.1033
0.0084
-12.27
< .0001

Partial R2
0.0002
0.7992
0.1925
0.0019
0.0003
0.0030
0.0000
0.0006

Model: DF=8, Sum of Sqs=106.5184, Mean Sq=13.3148, F value=31836.8, Pr> F <.0001
Error: DF=589, Sum of Sqs=0.2463, Mean Sq=0.0004
Root MSE=0.02005, R2=0.9977
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